Witness, , Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 19th day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, , Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 24th day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, , Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 1st day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, M.S. Cerré, Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 17th day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, , Clerk of our said Circuit Court , at the City of , this 20th day of December in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty – nine

Witness, , Clerk of our said Circuit Court , at the City of , this 20th day of December in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty – nine

DEPOSITIONS of witnesses, produced, sworn, and examined, at , in the City and County of ; , before me, , Law Commissioner for the said County, in a ^ twocertain causes now pending in the Saint Louis Circuit Court in the , between Dred Scott & Harriet his wife, plaintiffs, and Irene Emmerson, defendant, on the part of the Plaintiffs of lawful age, being duly sworn and examined on the part of the Plaintiff deposeth and saith:---

I didn’t know Doct. Emmerson; I was acquainted with Mrs. Emmerson. I have known her eight or ten or twelve years. I know the plaintiffs in these suits — they were in my service for two years about that time. I have known them some four or five years. They were under the control of Mrs. Emmerson — I engaged them of Mrs. Emmerson, but they were delivered to me by Mr. Sanford , her father. Mrs. Emmerson claimed these negroes as her slaves. - so they were her slaves I do not recollect if I heard Mrs. Emmerson say they were her slaves I do not recollect if I paid for their services to Mrs. Emmerson or Mr. Sanford as her agent. I think Mr. Russell paid for their services.— I think it has been between 2 & 3 years since they left my house. —I think Mrs. Emmerson resided up the Mississippi ^or Missouri river some years before they were in my service. At the time I hired these negroes they were in the service of Colonel Col . Bainbridge.-

The only way I know these negroes belonged to Mrs. Emmerson is that she hired them to me. I think it probable that Mrs. Emmerson & Mr. Sanford , at times received pay for their services. I do not know if the plaintiffs resided up the Mississippi or Missouri river. I do not know if Mr. Sanford was the agent of Mrs. Emmerson or the owner of the negroes

I, “The Law Commissioner of St. Louis County” do hereby certify that the deponent was by me duly sworn to testify the whole truth of her Knowledge in the matters in controversy in the Causes aforesaid; that said deponent was examined & her examination reduced to writing by me & subscribed by said deponent at the residence of in the City & County of St. Louis in the State of on the 20th day of December Anno Domini AD . 1849 and that the foregoing deposition was taken by consent of party’s -------------------------- In witness whereof, I have hereto set my hand & official seal this 20th day of December Anno Domini A.D . 1849

Witness, M.S. Cerré, Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 20th day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, M.S. Cerré, Clerk of our said Court, with the seal thereof hereto affixed, at office, in the City of St. Louis , this 22nd day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty- nine

Witness, , Clerk of our said Circuit Court , at the City of , this 12th day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty fifty

If the Jury believe from the witness that Dr. Emmerson was an officer of the U. S. Army — that he was the owner of the Slaves Dred Scott and Harriett , his wife before he was ordered to Rock Island and — that he took said Slaves with him as domestic servants when ordered to these posts — that they remained as servants at those Posts—and —and no where else until Dr. Emmerson was ordered South and that he then they were brought, them to Saint St . Louis , in a Slave State—and if they, believe that the Posts at Rock - Island and during the residence of said Slaves at each of them respectively was under Military Jurisdiction and that under the civil government of the Territory then in existance — they must find for the defendant —

GivenThat the statements of Mrs. Russell , wife of the witness Saml Russell, as detailed by the witness are not evidence in this case, and that the Jury shall disregard the same.

Given. If the Jury believe from the evidence that the witness Mr Russell allowed the plaintiff, to servand[?] in his family and render services as a slave in said family and that said witness paid the wages for said services to the defendant deft or ^ to any ^ one for her use it showing that said is evidence that said Witness hired said plaintiff plff from said Defendant Deft.

✓Given 1[?] If the Jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was held in Slavery by the deceased Doctor Emerson at situated in the Territory of the United States North West of the river Ohio , as defined by the act of Congress of July 12 1787. entitled "An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the North West of the River, , at any time after said ordinance went into effect, and at the time was the property of Said Emerson , then Said Plaintiff is entitled to his freedom —

14 [illegible] If the Jury believe from the evidence that that at any time after the 6th day of March 1820. the plaintiff was held in Slavery by the deceased Doctor Emerson , at , or at any other place in the Territory ceded by to the , under the name of , which lies north of 36 degrees & 30 minutes North latitude, not included within the limits of the State of , and that at the time he was So held in Slavery he was the Property of Said Emerson , then Said Plaintiff is entitled to his freedom — ✓Given

This day come the parties by their attorneys and comes also a jury Court: , , , , , , , , , , , and twelve good and lawful men who being duly elected tried and sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties upon their oaths do find and say that the defendant is guilty in manner and form as in the plaintiff’s declaration alleged. It is therefore considered that the plaintiff recover his freedom against said defendant and all persons claiming under her by title derived since the commencement of this suit. it’s further considered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant his costs in this behalf and have thereof execution.

This day come the parties by their attorneys and comes also a jury Court: , , , , , , , , , , , and twelve good and lawful men who being duly elected tried and sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties upon their oaths do find and say that the defendant is guilty in manner and form as in the plaintiff’s declaration alleged. It is therefore considered that the plaintiff recover of her freedom against said defendant and all persons claiming under her by title derived since the commencement of this suit. It is further considered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant his costs in this behalf and have thereof execution.

1. The voluntary removal of a slave, bu his master to a State, Territory or County in which slavery is prohibited, with a view to a residence there, does not entitle the slave to sue for his freedom, in the courts of this State.

2nd. Even if he could not acquire a right to his freedom in consequence the right of the deceased Dr. Emerson to employ and have servants for his own use there, he would acquire such freedom by being left by the deceased in the service of others as a slave, after he himself was removed, by orders to a different post. Julia vs. McKinny, 3 Mo. Rep. 193; Wilson vs. Melvin, 4 Mo. Rep. 592; Nat vs. Ruddle, 3 Mo. 282; Ralph vs. Duncan , 2 Mo. 139.

3rd. The is a valid and binding law. It has often been recognized by this court: Winny vs. Whiteside , 1 Mo. 334; Mary vs. Tippin et al. 1 Mo. 520; Lagrange vs. Choteau , 2 Mo. 19; Theoteste vs. Choteau 2 Mo. 116; Vincent vs. Duncan , 2 Mo. 174; Ralph vs. Duncan , 2 Mo. 139.

The States of this Union, although associated for some purposes of government, yet in relation to their municipal concerns have always been regarded as foreign to each other. The law of descents of one State is not regarded in another, in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons. So of the law of wills, administrations, judicial proceedings, and all other matters of mere internal police. The courts of one State do not take judicial notice of the laws of other States. They, when it is necessary to be shown what they are, must be pr oved like other facts. So of the laws of the , enacted for the mere purpose of governing a territory. These laws have no force in the States of the Union; they are local and relate to the municipal affairs of the territory. Their effect is confined within its limits, and beyond those limits they have no more effect, in any State, than the municipal laws of one State would have in any other State; Cohens v. State of Virginia 6 Wheat. 264. This doctrine is declared and maintained, not only with respect to nations strictly foreign to each other, but also to the several States of this Union. Every State has the right of determining how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the limits of the State for which they were enacted. The respect allowed them will depend altogether on their conformity to the policy of our institutions. No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws. In the Conflict of Laws, sec. 36, it is said: "but of the nature, and extent and utility of this recognition of foreign laws, respecting the state and condition of persons, every nation must judge for itself, and certainly is not bound to recognize them, when they would be prejudicial to their own interests. It is, in the strictest sense a matter of the comity of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation, superceding all discretion on the subject." So in sec. 32, it is said, "it is difficult to conceive upon what ground a claim can be rested, to give any municipal laws an extra-territorial effect, when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other nations or to those of their subjects; it would at once annihilate the sovereignty and equality of every nation, which should be called upon to recognize and enforce them, or to compel it to desert its own proper interests and duty to its own subjects in favor of strangers, who were regardless of both. A claim so naked of any principle or just authority to support it, is wholly inadmissible."

Again, "the comity of nations is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the State by which it is shown, and is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial to its interests. In the silence of the positive rule, affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interest." Sec. 38. It is a humiliating spectacle, to see the courts of a State confiscating the property of her own citizens by the command of a foreign law. If Scott is freed, by what means will it be effected, but by the constitution of the , or the territorial laws of the ? Now, what principle requires the interference of this court? Are not those governments capable of enforcing their own laws; and if they are not, are we concerned that such laws should be enforced, and that, too, at the cost of our own citizens? States in which an absolute prohibition of slavery prevails, maintain that if a slave, with the consent of his master, touch their soil he thereby becomes free. The prohibition in the act, commonly called the , is absolute. How is that to be interpreted? That act prevails along our entire western boundary; if our courts take upon themselves the task of enforcing the laws of other States, it is nothing but reasonable that they should take them as they are understood where they are promulgated. If a slave passes our western boundary, by the order of his master, and goes into the territory subject to the , does he thereby become free? Most of the courts of this Union would say that he does, if his freedom is sought to be recovered under the laws of that territory. If our courts undertake the task of enforcing that act, should they not take it as most of the other States would? Some of our old cases say, that a hiring for two days would be a violation of the and entitle the slave to his freedom. If two days would do, why not one? Is there any difference in principle or morality between holding a slave in a free territory two days more than one day? And if one day, why not six hours? The old cases say, the intent is nothing, the act is the thing.

Now, are we prepared to say, that we shall suffer these laws to be enforced in our courts? On almost three sides the is surrounded by free soil. If one of our slaves touch that soil with his master's assent, he becomes entitled to his freedom. Considering the numberless instances in which those living along an extreme frontier would have occasion to occupy their slaves beyond our boundary, how hard would it be if our courts should liberate all the slaves who should thus be employed! How unreasonable to ask it! If a master sends his slave to hunt his horses or cattle beyond the boundary, shall he thereby be liberated? But our courts, it is said, will not go so far. If not go the entire length, why go at all? The obligation to enforce to the proper degree is as obligatory as to enforce to any degree. Slavery is introduced by a continuance in the territory for six hours as well as for twelve months, and so far as our laws are concerned, the offense is as great in the one case as in the other. Laws operate only within the territory of the State for which they are made, and by enforcing them here, we, contrary to all principle, give them an extra-territorial effect Chancellor Kent says: "A statute, though not in the nature of a judicial proceeding, is, however, a record of the highest nature. But if a statute, though a matter of record, was to have the same effect in one State as in another, then one State would be dictating laws for another, and a fearful collision of jurisdiction would instantly follow. That construction is utterly inadmissible. While it is conceded to be a principle of public law, requisite for the safe intercourse and commerce of mankind, that acts, valid by the law of the State where they arise, are valid everywhere, it is at the same time, to be understood, that this principle relates only to civil acts founded on the volition of the parties, and not to such as proceed from the sovereign power. The force of the latter cannot be permitted to operate beyond the limits of the territory, without affecting the necessary independence of nations." 2 Kent 117-8.

This language is used when speaking in reference to the legislation of other States of the Union. It is conceived that there is no ground to presume or to impute any volition to Dr. Emerson , that his slave should have his freedom. He was ordered by superior authority to the posts where his slave was detained in servitude, and in obedience to that authority, he repaired to them with his servant, as he very naturally supposed he had a right to do. To construe this into an assent to his slave's freedom would be doing violence to his acts. Nothing but a persuasion that it is a duty to enforce the foreign law as though it was one of our own, could ever induce a court to put such a construction on his conduct. The present attitude of the parties to this suit is conclusive, as to an actual consent, and nothing but the foreign law or the aid derived from it, can raise an implied one. If the had prohibited slavery within her limits, and our courts were called upon to execute that law, some zeal might be tolerated in our efforts to execute it; but while slavery obtains here, there is no consideration which would warrant us in going such lengths against our own citizens, for having permitted their slaves to remain in the territory of a State where slavery is prohibited.

In States and Kingdoms in which slavery is the least countenanced, and where there is a constant struggle against its existence, it is admitted law, that if a slave accompanies his master to a country in which slavery is prohibited, and remains there a length of time, if during his continuance in such country there is no act of manumission decreed by its courts, and he afterwards returns to his master's domicil, where slavery prevails, he has no right to maintain a suit founded upon a claim of permanent freedom. This is the law of , where it is said that her air is too pure for a slave to breathe in, and that no sooner does he touch her soil than his shackles fall from him; the case of slave Grace, 2 Haggard Admiralty Rep. 94. , in his , says, "it has been solemnly decided that the law of abhors and will not endure the existence of slavery within the nation, and consequently, so soon as a slave lands in , he becomes ipso facto, a free man, and discharged from the state of servitude; and there is no doubt that the same principle pervades the common law of the non-slaveholding States in ; that is to say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their removal thither." But he continues, "it is a very different question how far the original state of slavery might re-attach upon the party, if he should return to the country by whose laws he was declared to be and was held as a slave;" sec. 95, 6. In the case of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Ames, 18 Pick., Judge Shaw , although declining to give an express opinion upon this question, intimates very clearly that if the slave returns to his former country where slavery obtains, his condition would not be changed. In the case of Graham v. Strader , 5 Mon. 183, the court of Appeals in held, that the owner of a slave who resides in , and who permits his slave to go to in charge of an agent for a temporary purpose, does not forfeit his right of property in such slave.

An attempt has been made to show, that the comity extended to the laws of other States, is a matter of discretion, to be determined by the courts of that State in which the laws are proposed to be enforced. If it is a matter of discretion, that discretion must be controlled by circumstances. Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals, but States, have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. Although we may, for our own sakes, regret that the avarice and hard-heartedness of the progenitors of those who are now so sensitive on the subject, ever introduced the institution among us, yet we will not go to them to learn law, morality or religion on the subject.

As to the consequences of slavery, they are much more hurtful to the master than the slave. There is no comparison between the slave of the and the cruel, uncivilized negro in . When the condition of our slaves is contrasted with the state of their miserable race in ; when their civilization, intelligence and instruction in religious truths are considered, and the means now employed to restore them to the country from which they have been torn, bearing with them the blessings of civilized life, we are almost persuaded that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the providences of God, who makes the evil passions of men subservient to his own glory, a means of placing that unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.

Judge Ryland concurring, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Now at this day come the parties aforesaid by their respective attorneys, and waiving a Jury, submit the issues joined between the parties herein to the court, and the court doth find that the defendant is not guilty in manner and form as in the plain- tiffs declaration alleged. It is therefore considered and adjudged by the court that said plaintiff take nothing by his said suit in this behalf, but that said defendant go thereof without day and recover of said plain-tiff her costs and charges herein expended and have thereof execution.

Now at this day come the parties aforesaid by their respective attorneys, and by consent ^ and according to the stipulation filed herein and on motion of said parties, it is ordered by the court that the judgment heretofore rendered herein, be and the same is hereby set aside and for naught held: and thereupon the parties herein waiving a Jury, submit the issues joined between the parties herein to the court, and the court doth find that the defendant is not guilty in manner and form as in the plaintiffs declaration alleged. It is therefore considered and adjudged by the court that said plaintiff take nothing by her said suit in this behalf, but that said defendant go thereof without day and recover of said plaintiff her costs and charges herein expended and have thereof execution.

, who is personally known to the court, comes into open court, and acknowledges the execution by him of a Deed of Emancipation to his slaves, Dred Scott , aged about forty eight years, of full negro blood and color, and Harriet Scott wife of said Dred , aged thirty nine years, also of full negro blood & color, and a daughter of said Dred & Harriet, aged nineteen years of full negro color, and , also a daughter of said Dred & Harriet, aged ten years likewise of full negro blood & color.

On motion of defendants attorney it is ordered that the Sheriff of do render his account to the court of the wages that have come to his hands of the earnings of the above named plaintiff and that the said sheriff do pay to the defendant all such wages that now remain in his hands, excepting all commissions and expenses to which the said Sheriff may be legally entitled.